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Cohen: Evidence: The Erosion of Legal Safeguards on the Admissibility of

CASE COMMENTS
EVIDENCE: THE EROSION OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS
ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BITE MARK EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
Bradford v. State, 460 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984)
The state charged the appellant with first degree murder.' Circumstantial
2
evidence implicating the appellant included "abrasion patterns" on his finger.
The trial court allowed testimony by an expert in forensic odontology and bite
mark analysis.3 The expert expressed the opinion that to a reasonable degree
of dental certainty the victim's teeth made the "marks" on the appellant's
hand.4 Photographs of appellant's hand and models of the victim's teeth were
shown to the jury and used by the doctor to explain his testimony.5 On appeal,
appellant contended the forensic testimony should have been excluded. 6 The
Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and HELD,
the trial court's admission of bite mark analysis was not an abuse of its discretion, and the probative value of such expert testimony is for the trier of
7
fact to determine.
The admissibility of scientific evidence has traditionally been problematic.
For several reasons, courts have deliberately restricted admission of evidence
based on novel scientific principles. 8 Courts realize jurors tend to be overly
1. Bradford v. State, 460 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984). Appellant attended a
party at the victim's home on the day of the murder and accepted an invitation by the victim's
roommate to spend the night on the couch. At some point that night,* the victim was strangled,
and her bed was set on fire. Appellant contended that the victim's jealous boyfriend had forced
him to leave in the middle of the night. Physical evidence discovered in the victim's bedroom
failed to link appellant to the crimes. The state's most convincing evidence was a forensic odontologist's testimony that, to a reasonable degree of dental certainty, the abrasion patterns on appellant's finger had been made by the victim's teeth. Id. at 927-29.
2. Id. at 929. A dermatologist testifying for the defense opined that one of the "marks"
on appellant's hand was a freckle, not an abrasion. Id.

3.

Id. For a discussion of forensic odontology, see generally I.

SOPHER, FORENSIC DENTISTRY

(1976). Forensic odontology is the application of dentistry to law. The major fields comprising this
science are as follows: (1) bite mark comparison; (2) dental identification of human bodies; (3)
trauma and oral injury; and (4) dental malpractice. Id. at 3-4.
4. 460 So. 2d at 929.
5. Id.
6. Id. The majority opinion did not expand on appellant's grounds for objection to this
testimony. The dissent, however, acknowledged the potential unreliability and highly prejudicial
nature of this expert opinion. Id. at 936-38 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 930.
8. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
149 (1976) ("Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented
by 'experts' with impressive credentials."); see also MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 203, at 605 (W.
Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984) (many courts apply special rules of admissibility when expert witnesses
are called to testify about scientific tests or conclusions).
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persuaded by conclusions supported by technical formulae and scientific data. 9
The perceived inability of the trier of fact to properly assess the value of scientific expert testimony led to the development of particular rules governing
the admissibility of scientific evidence.' 0
In the landmark case of Frye v. United States," the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia established a general rule imposing a
special burden on the admissibility of novel scientific theories into evidence.' 2
The Frye standard requires a preliminary showing that the technique utilized
by an expert in forming his opinion has achieved "general acceptance" in the
relevant scientific community." : The Frye court considered the admissibility of
polygraph evidence 4 as a case of first impression." Rejecting the proffered
evidence, the court held that lack of sufficient recognition by the scientific
community precluded its admission.' 6 Though adopted by many courts in the
ensuing years,' 7 the current status of the Frye standard is difficult to assess.'"
The subsequent adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence'" signaled a clear
departure from the stringent "general acceptance" requirement of Fye.2" Federal
Rule 702 permits expert testimony to be introduced into evidence when it will

9. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (2d ed. 1978)
(advocating the exercise of judicial restraint when admitting evidence based on new scientific developments that have not yet proven reliable) [hereinafter cited as A. MOENSSENS].
10. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 45 (1970) (including a flow chart illustrating the procedure to follow in determining the admissibility
of evidence); cf. FED. R. EviD. 702 (governing the admissibility of expert testimony).
11.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12. Id. at 1014. Without citing any authority or precedent, the Frye court declared:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
13. Id.; see also People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 49, 429 N.E.2d 100, 103, 444 N.Y.S.2d
581, 584 (1981) (test is not whether a particular procedure is unanimously endorsed by the scientific
community, but whether it is generally accepted as reliable).
14. 293 F. at 1014. Technically, the defendant sought to introduce results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test, a forerunner of the polygraph. Id.
15. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1204 (1980).
16. 293 F. at 1014.
17. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) ("This criterion
of 'general acceptance' in the scientific community has come to the standard in almost all of the
courts in the country which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence.");
accord A. MOENSSENS, supra note 9, at 6. But cf infranotes 18 & 21 and accompanying text.
18. See generally A. MOENSSENS, supra note 9; Giannelli, supra note 15; McCormick, Scientific
Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REv. 879, 885-86 (1982).
19. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. app. (1982)).
20. The broad criterion of Rule 702 that the evidence "assist the trier of fact" is inconsistent
with the conservative approach of Frye, which requires that underlying techniques be "generally
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help the factfinder to understand the evidence or to decide an issue.2' Some
authorities suggest the Frye standard has been abrogated by the enactment of
Federal Rule 702,22 while others contend Rule 702 has had no effect on the
2
precedential value of Fye.3

2 4
The scientific technique of bite mark analysis, a subset of forensic dentistry,
identifies persons by comparison of their dentition to a bite mark registration

in flesh or other material. 25 The odontologist compares the bite mark with the

suspect's dentition by finding points of similarity.26 Assuming the proper procedures have been employed, 27 courts addressing the issue have accepted the
reliability of these tests. 2 Additionally, expert testimony interpreting the results

accepted" in the fields in which they belong. Compare Frye, 293 F. at 1014 with FED. R. EVID.
702.
21. FED. R. EvID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN
702[01] (1976) (Fed. Rule 702 codifies federal common
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE
law). Although there were more restrictions on opinion evidence prior to the Federal Rules, helpfulness to the trier of fact was an essential condition of admissibility. Id.
702[03] (test eliminated); Gian22. See, e.g., 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 21,
nelli, supra note 15, at 122, 128-29 (22 jurisdictions have adopted variations of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and survival of the Frye standard is arguable); see also United States v. Stifel, 433
F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970) (admitting neutron activation analysis to identify the source of bomb
fragments), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1969) (court allowed evidence interpreting the results of a chemical test that had not been accepted
by the scientific community because it was developed specifically for this trial), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970). A concurring opinion stated, "society need not tolerate homicide until there
develops a body of medical literature about some particular lethal agent." Id. at 75 (Mann, J.,
concurring). But see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
23. Post-Rule 702 cases have continued to cite Frye as applicable without mentioning Rule
702. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148; see
also S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 426 (2d ed. 1977) (suggests
the possibility that Rule 702 was intended to codify the Frye test).
24. See supra note 3.
25. See, e.g., I. SOPHER, supra note 3, at 141. Human skin is a poor medium for bite mark
registration. Post-bite tissue change and natural deterioration may alter the bite mark. Id.
26. See, e.g., W. HARVEY, DENTAL IDENTIFICATION AND FORENSIC 0DONTOLOGY 170 (1976).
Bite mark identification involves three steps: the gathering of data about the bite mark; comparison
with relevant data of the suspect; and evaluation of the similarities or differences revealed by the
comparison. Id.; see also I. SOPHER, supra note 3, at 140. There has been much debate over whether
a requisite number of concordant points is needed to enable the expert to conclude that the suspect
is the bite perpetrator. Id.
27. The conclusion in the instant case was based upon an expert's examination of photographs
of abrasion patterns on appellant's hand and the comparison of those patterns with models of the
victim's teeth. 460 So. 2d at 930. Cf. People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 49, 429 N.E.2d 100,
103, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (1981) ("The techniques employed (photography, freezing of tissue
specimens, the taking of dental molds, visual observation) are accepted and approved by the majority
of the experts in the field.").
28. See note 27 and accompanying text. See, e.g., State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541 (Mo.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1980); People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1978); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976); State v. Peoples, 227
Kan. 127, 605 P.2d 135 (1980).
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of such comparisons may be offered to prove an assailant's identity in a criminal
2
trial. 11
In People v.Marx,"' the California Supreme Court allowed expert testimony
matching a murder suspect's dentition to a bite mark on the victim. Despite
an acknowledged lack of "general acceptance" of the principles and techniques
of bite mark analysis, the Marx court affirmed the admissibility of bite mark
identification." While asserting the continuing vitality of Flye, ' the court distinguished bite mark evidence from scientific techniques not verifiable in court."
The court emphasized the clarity of the bite marks involved, and stressed that
the trier of fact could review the exhibits and draw independent conclusions."
Furthermore, the Marx court attempted to modify the Frye standard by suggesting that "general acceptance" should go to the weight rather than the
admissibility of the evidence."' In later cases, courts have cited Marx as precedent
for recognizing the "general acceptance" of bite mark analysis."
In Bundy v. State,' a forensic odontologist was allowed to compare a photograph of bite marks on a murder victim to models of the accused's teeth. "
The trial court found that because the science of odontology is "generally
recognized," the evidence was admissible.' 9 Thus, the court inferred certain
prerequisites to the admissibility of scientific evidence without specifically mentioning the Fye criterion. As further justification for admission of this evidence,
the court noted the jury was able to evaluate the evidence by looking directly
at photographs and models.4 " Additionally, the jury could determine the weight
and credibility to give these comparison techniques. 4 ' The defendant was con29. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 75 Cal. App. 3d 384, 142 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1977) (bite mark
App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350
evidence admissible in a homicide case); People v. Milone, 43 Ill.
(bite mark evidence admissible to identify a murder suspect); see generally Giannelli, supra note 15
(emphasizing the problems inherent in and the difficulty in application of the Frye standard); Note,
The Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 309 (1978) (explaining procedures used
by dental experts to identify a bite perpetrator).
30. 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
31. Id. at 109, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
32. Id. at 110-11, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56. The Marx court did not agree with criticism of
the Frye test. Id.
33. Id. at 111, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Bite mark evidence is significantly different because
the trier of fact is shown models, photos, x-rays and slides of the wounds and teeth. The extent
to which the purported bite marks conform with irregularities in the teeth can actually be reviewed
and compared by the trier of fact. Id.
34. Id. (in admitting the evidence, "the court did not have to sacrifice its independence and
common sense.").
35. Id. at 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
36. See, e.g., People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 67. Marx has been
called the "landmark" California case in the area of bite mark evidence. Id.
37. 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984).
38. Id. at 336. Photographs of the bite marks were enlarged to actual size. A dental expert
took wax impressions and photographs of appellant's teeth. From these impressions, actual models
of teeth were cast. The forensic odontologist was then able to compare the particular characteristics
of the teeth with the flesh indentations as revealed in the photographs. Id.
39. Id. at 348.
40. Id. at 349; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (opportunity to compare photographs with models renders bite mark evidence unique).
41.
455 So. 2d at 349.
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victed of murder, 42 and on appeal challenged the admissibility of this expert
odontological testimony. 43 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and found the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding the science

of odontology an "acceptable foundation" for the admissibility of expert tes4
timony. 4
The instant court expanded the scope of admissible scientific evidence by
extending the "general acceptance" of bite mark analysis to include comparisons
of abrasion patterns. 45 Citing the Florida Supreme Court's acceptance of forensic
dental testimony in Bundy, the instant court upheld the admissibility of "bite
mark" testimony. 46 The instant court made no distinctions between the type
of evidence received in the precedent cases and the testimony offered in this
case. 47 The majority did not explicitly articulate the Frye standard nor express
any concern about the reliability of this technique. 4 The instant court justified
the admission of this evidence by emphasizing that the jury examined actual
49
evidence used by the experts in formulating their opinions.
Dissenting, Judge Campbell distinguished the instant case from prior cases,
reasoning that wounds involved here were "scrape marks" as opposed to "bite
marks.''50 The instant case lacked an identifiable human bite mark showing the
configuration of teeth as in Bundy. 5' Conceding that the science of odontology
is generally recognized, the dissent urged that no scientifically acceptable procedure exists to identify a person from a scrape mark. 52 The dissent cautioned
s
and
that this expert's conclusion was based on "stacking of probabilities, " 53
suggested the evidence should have been excluded as unreliable and extremely
54
prejudicial.
The instant decision demonstrates a major shift from the cautious judicial
policy of Frye. The admissibility of bite mark testimony involves conflicting
42. Id. at 334.
43. Id. at 348.
44. Id. at 349.
45. Bradford, 460 So. 2d at 930.
46. Id. at 929-30. The majority opinion referred to the Florida Supreme Court's acceptance
of "this type of bite mark testimony." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 930 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 937-38; see also supra notes 1-2 & 26 and accompanying text.
51. 460 So. 2d at 938 (Campbell, J., dissenting). Bite mark analysis is based on finding
points of similarity between bite mark indentations and moldings of teeth. Without distinguishing
characteristics, neither the expert nor the trier of fact can make proper comparisons. Id.; see infra
text accompanying notes 68-71 (analysis of why bite mark analysis was inappropriate in the instant
case).
52. 460 So. 2d at 937-38 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 938. Only the forensic odontologist "determined that the mark on appellant's hand
[was] a reasonably certain human tooth mark. Based on that probability, he determine[d] that there
[was] a reasonable probability, the victim's tooth caused the mark." Id.
54. Id.; see also
D.C.A. 1984). Even
appellant's hand, the
case. Id. Apparently,
such a scant wound.

Initial Brief of Appellant at 26, Bradford v. State, 460 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d
accepting as true the expert's conclusions about the existence of marks on
factual basis for the expert odontological testimony was insufficient in this
in no case has bite mark identification testimony been admitted based upon
Id. at 26 n.8.
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concerns. On the one hand, courts do not want to influence the jury with
superficially impressive testimony that may lack a corresponding probative value."
On the other hand, courts do not want to withhold relevant information from
the trier of fact.' To assist in the truth-determining purpose of a trial, evidence
must be dependable. 7 The trustworthiness of evidence originating from a scientific principle rests upon three criteria:5" the veracity of the underlying principle; ' the validity of the procedure applying that principle;" ' and the correct
utilization of the procedure in a specific factual setting." The trial court must
carefully scrutinize these factors in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
The Frye standard embodies a conservative approach designed to prevent
the introduction of specious and unfounded scientific conclusions."' Where the
scientific technique is offered to identify the perpetrator of a crime, as in the
instant case, such an exercise of judicial restraint is especially warranted. Bite
mark evidence is usually conclusive of the ultimate issue of guilt; thus, the
admission of unreliable bite mark testimony may be particularly prejudicial to
the accused. 6 Dangers of undue prejudice should be considered with respect
to scientific evidence, and are within the realm of judicial rather than scientific
expertise. 4
Though courts have often favored a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence, the instant court follows the trend to liberalize
admissibility requirements."5 Based on the assumption that each individual's

55. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 15, at 1223-24 (criticizing the Frye general acceptance
standard for excluding reliable evidence); see also Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REv. 313, 314 (1963-64) (arguing that the Frye test is overly restrictive).
57. Giannelli, supra note 15, at 1200.
58. Id. at 1201.
59. Id. In the instant case, the underlying principle was bite mark analysis. This procedure
is generally recognized as reliable by the scientific community. See, e.g., 455 So. 2d at 348-49.
60. See Giannelli, supra note 15, at 1201; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
61. See Giannelli, supra note 15, at 1201; see also supra notes 51 & 54 and accompanying text.
62. See Strong, supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Addison, 498
F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (conservative nature of the Frye test is its primary advantage).
63. See Note, supra note 29, at 325-26.
Bite mark evidence is more persuasive on the ultimate issue of guilt than other analogous
forms of evidence. For example, fingerprints tend to be circumstantial or associative; that
is, they rarely decide a case alone, but tend merely to link a defendant to the scene of
the crime or an object involved in the crime. By contrast, bite marks, in the usual case,
will be conclusive of the guilt issue: the logical distance between the fact of biting and
the ultimate issue of guilt is short.
Id.
64. See FED. R. EvID. 403 (providing that relevant "evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury"); see also CAL. EvIo. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
65. Some courts have held that the general acceptance issue goes to the weight rather than
the admissibility of the evidence. Set, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d at 438. Other courts
have reasoned that the general acceptance standard applies to the underlying principles or methodology rather than the particular studies based on those principles. See, e.g., United States v.
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dentition is unique, both Marx and Bundy deemed bite mark evidence sufficiently
reliable, and thus admissible.6 Both cases involved indentations which could
clearly be identified as human bite marks, and the identification techniques
employed 67 were accepted by most experts in the field. 68 Both courts noted that

the jury's opportunity to observe the actual data upon which the expert based
his opinion was crucial to the admissibility of the evidence. 69 By contrast, the
instant case offered no identifiable bite mark to support the expert's opinion.7"
The instant case wounds were merely abrasion patterns, which have no unique
characteristics for the jury to analyze. 7' Nevertheless, the instant court similarly
admitted the bite mark testimony. By failing to require more tangible evidence
any
on which to base the bite mark comparison, the instant court disregarded
72
evidence.
scientific
of
admission
the
on
safeguards
legal
effective
The liberality with which the instant court received this evidence sets a
dangerous precedent for future cases. The instant court did not explicitly balance
the probative value of the odontological testimony against the danger of misleading the jury.7 3 Instead, the majority assumed the jury would be able to
adequately measure the credibility of the evidence. 74 As the dissent posited, this
may be an unrealistic expectation which unfairly prejudices the accused. 75 The
majority strictly followed Bundy without analyzing the particular facts of the
76

instant case.

Si~ice the advent of Federal-Rule 70277 and the acrimbnious attacks on the
Frye test, 78 courts are increasingly receptive to scientific evidence. While stringent
prerequisites may exclude relevant information from the trier of fact, these
cautionary guidelines are necessary to prevent admission of unreliable evidence.
The severe consequences of an erroneous judgment based on dubious scientific
techniques necessitate a posture of judicial caution.7 The trial court's authority

denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). Many courts
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
have simply ignored the standard. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). Finally, several jurisdictions have expressly rejected Frye, leaving the
task of regulating the admission of scientific evidence to the doctrines of relevance and helpfulness
of expert testimony. See, e.g., State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979); State v. Kersting,
50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981).
66. See supra notes 33-34, 39 & 51 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 33 & 39 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 33-34 & 51 and accompanying text.
70. 460 So. 2d at 937-38.
71. See generally supra notes 26-27, 33, 51 & 61 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
73. See 460 So. 2d 926.
74. See id. at 930.
75. Id. at 938.
76. See id. at 929-30.
77. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
78. Commentators have often criticized the Frye test. See, e.g., A. MoENssENs, supra note 9,
at 19 ("archaic"); Boyce, supra note 56; Strong, supra note 10, at 10-15. But see Note, supra note

29.
79. A. MOENSSENS, supra note 9, at 7.
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in determining the admissibility of evidence"' requires discretion on a case-bycase basis. The precedent set by the instant court, however, may signal judicial
tolerance for bite mark comparison testimony under any circumstances.
GEENA

80.

D.

COHEN

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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